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Wilentz, Sean. No Property In Man: Slavery and Antislavery at the Nation’s 
Founding. Harvard University Press, $26.95 ISBN 9780674972223 
Measuring the Monster 
Noted historian Sean Wilentz offers a weighty and sure-to-be controversial contribution 
to the extensive historiography on slavery and the original intent of the Constitution. Many 
historians agree the Constitution was, explicitly or implicitly, a proslavery document, ratified by 
elite white men many of whom had an interest in slavery as an American institution. But Wilentz 
contends that the Constitution was more ambivalent toward slavery—even indirectly antislavery 
in its language—than most scholars acknowledge. The Constitution’s limited protection of 
slavery could not be equated to the recognition of slavery as a permanent institution. The 
national governing document failed to specifically recognize property in man and thus left 
slavery as a creation of the individual states, an important distinction for Wilentz and one that 
provided the political space necessary for antislavery constitutionalism to thrive in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Antislavery efforts ignited in earnest with Vermont’s 1777 ban on 
slavery and grew with such force that the provisions for slavery’s protection placed in the 
Constitution were hard won despite antislavery’s powerful presence at the 1787 convention. If 
antislavery rhetoric and ideology grew increasingly radical before the 1860s, so too then did 
proslavery assertions about the Constitution, Wilentz argues.  
Wilentz takes issue with how modern scholars contextualize emancipation before the 
Civil War. By comparing private manumission and gradual emancipation before the war to the 
decisive end of institutional slavery in 1865, prewar antislavery efforts appear tame and 
unrevolutionary. On the contrary, Wilentz contends, “proscribing and then eradicating an entire 
class of property” through government power at the state level in the northern United States 
gradually over the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century represented a profound 
ideological shift for a northern populace with a not inconsiderable presence of enslaved workers 
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(36). That antislavery societies existed at all, much less gained success in their efforts in the face 
of substantial proslavery resistance, was a radical circumstance. Abolitionists were rarely 
satisfied with their progress either and kept pushing at the boundaries of emancipation to 
encompass more radical freedom. Within the historical time period, slaveholders had much to 
fear from abolition movements—movements that often looked to the freedoms guaranteed in the 
Constitution for lawful impetus.  
Proslavery resistance to antislavery efforts of any kind centered on property rights and 
the division of powers between state and federal government. As antislavery forces worked to 
limit slavery’s advance into the Louisiana Territory, proslavery politicians claimed that the 
Constitution expressly recognized property in man, namely through the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1793 and the Three-Fifths compromise. As Congress debated ending the Atlantic slave trade just 
prior to 1808, John Randolph encouraged secession in response to what he viewed as despotic 
federal interventions onto property rights in slavery. After 1815, slaveholders began to purport 
the institution as a positive good and chaffed at any limitation of slavery in western territories. 
Throughout the process of the Missouri Compromise, proslavery constituents continually 
affirmed their adherence to a proslavery constitution, even as the federal government regulated 
the presence of slavery in the territories. As hard line proslavery representatives passed a series 
of gag bills in the late 1830s, they continued to embrace a proslavery originalist interpretation in 
the Constitution, a belief nationally vindicated in the Dred Scott case. 
In response, abolitionists enlisted an antislavery originalist view of the Constitution. 
Antislavery proponents like Quakers, Benjamin Lundy, and Representative George Thatcher 
continually bombarded Congress with petitions to act within its federally granted powers to end 
or limit slavery. James G. Birney and Salmon P. Chase argued that the Fifth Amendment 
empowered the federal government to end slavery immediately and restore to enslaved black 
persons their oppressed rights of self-ownership. In his Cooper Institute speech, Abraham 
Lincoln repudiated proslavery constitutionalism by asserting congressional authority over 
slavery in the territories and denying that the U.S. Constitution recognized property in man. Even 
a conservative northern Democrat like Stephen Douglas eventually admitted the Constitution did 
not recognize property in people. 
The most significant contributions of Wilentz’s book are his detailed explanations of the 
substance of constitutional debates in the decades leading up to the Civil War. He is also careful 
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to root those debates over the constitutional limits of power and the protection of slavery in their 
historical context. With No Property in Man, Wilentz makes the evolving antislavery and 
proslavery conceptions of national power perhaps more crystalline than any other scholar has yet 
done. Some problematic moments are to be found, however. His effort to explain James 
Madison’s fence-sitting when it came to that founder’s constitutional approach to slavery seems 
particularly strained (see pages 223, 328-9). During ratification, Madison and his allies were 
caught in the awkward position of defending the Constitution “as at once a blow against the slave 
trade and a firm protector of slaveholders’ property rights” (143). The largest challenge southern 
Federalists faced was convincing slaveholding southerners that the Constitution protected 
property in slaves even as it limited the Atlantic (and possibly the domestic) slave trade. 
Madison’s equivocal efforts, Wilentz asserts, “helped initiate both proslavery and antislavery 
interpretations of the framers’ work” (146). Perhaps the Constitution was not so resolutely 
antislavery after all. Wilentz also admits that Lincoln understood how necessary the Thirteenth 
Amendment was in 1865. Because the “framer’s work still contained its central paradox about 
slavery,” the Union needed to amend or rewrite its original Constitution, “beginning with an 
abolition amendment, in order to secure a nation of freedom” (266). On the other hand, some of 
Wilentz’s strongest evidence comes from radical abolitionists like William Goodell and 
Frederick Douglass, who believed that the Constitution was an antislavery document and that the 
Fifth Amendment gave the federal government the power to restore the lost property rights of 
enslaved persons by ending slavery immediately. Similarly, Lincoln dismissed the Dred Scott 
decision by asserting an antislavery understanding of the Constitution.  
 If any part of Wilentz’s reconsideration of the Constitution and of antislavery projects is 
potentially troubling, it is the implications of the work. If Americans could produce a decades-
long debate over the original meaning of the Constitution on slavery and even fight a war over 
those disagreements, perhaps the founders’ refusal to recognize property in man was little more 
than Enlightenment sophistry. Wilentz himself acknowledges that “most free blacks found 
themselves either locked in landless rural penury or relegated to the meanest city occupations, 
despised by whites as social outcasts”—a national epidemic of racial poverty perpetuated far into 
the twentieth century and beyond (35). Expanding the historical lens to 1619-2019 should focus 
scholarly attention on the substantial racial disparities that still exist in America, disparities that 
characterize American history more extensively than even Wilentz’s robust presentation of 
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American antislavery moralism from 1777-1865. Antislavery projects are one thing; radical and 
meaningful egalitarianism is another. Wilentz successfully argues that the Constitution did not 
enshrine slavery on a national scale and that antislavery forces embraced a healthy tradition of 
antislavery constitutionalism. But in America’s racial dystopia, constitutional arguments have 
only gone so far to mitigate the extensive damages of institutional slavery. A host of other 
structural and social limitations circumscribes black people in America regardless of the 
Constitution’s stance on slavery. 
A recent documentary about James Baldwin highlighted the famous author’s concern 
about the moral center of the nation. “I am terrified at the moral apathy—at the death of the 
heart—which is happening in this country. These people [white supremacists] have deluded 
themselves for so long that they really don’t think I’m human. I base this on their conduct, not on 
what they say. And this means that they have become, in themselves, moral monsters.” In the 
exhausting debate about the nature of the Constitution as a conduit of emancipation versus the 
Constitution as the bedrock of slavery, it is possible to lose sight of the grand scope of race and 
racism in American history. It would be a mistake to focus on the reverse of Baldwin’s equation, 
emphasizing ambivalent words over the larger actions that allowed slavery to progress. While 
Wilentz is hardly guilty of focusing on words alone, the argument over the founding document 
and its writers divorces the moment of its creation from the larger moral grievances that yet 
haunt America. “All of the western nations have been caught in a lie,” critiqued Baldwin, “the lie 
of their pretended humanism: this means that their history has no moral justification, and that the 
West has no moral authority.”1 Wilentz is no doubt correct about the Constitution’s creeping 
antislavery power. However, if we use only the Constitution to measure the moral monsters of 
America, we have unintentionally obfuscated the nature and the power of those monsters who 
still wield cultural and governmental authority in the land of the free. 
J. Matthew Ward is a PhD candidate at Louisiana State University working on a dissertation 
about military occupation in Civil War era Louisiana. His email is jward34@lsu.edu. 
                                                 
1 I Am Not Your Negro, directed by Paoul Peck (2016; Berlin, Germany: Velvet Film, 2017). First quote at 32:40; 
second quote at 1:14:22. See also, James Baldwin, No Name in the Street (New York: Vintage International, 1972), 
and Tim Grierson, “‘I Am Not Your Negro’: How a New Doc Turns James Baldwin into a Prophet,” Rolling Stone, 
February 3, 2017, https://www.rollingstone.com/movies/movie-features/i-am-not-your-negro-how-a-new-doc-turns-
james-baldwin-into-a-prophet-117114/. 
4
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 29
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol21/iss1/29
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.21.1.29
